OPINION

BAILEY, Judge.

Case Summary

The Boone Circuit Court determined that Jeremiah Cline ("Cline") is not required to register as a sex offender, but also determined that it lacked authority to order the removal of Cline's name and information from the Indiana Sex Offender Registry ("the Registry"). Cline appeals and presents the sole issue of whether the trial court has authority to expunge Cline's information from the Registry. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

Then twenty-year-old Cline engaged in sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old in February of 2001 and with a fourteen-year-old on June 4, 2001. On May 31, 2002, Cline pled guilty to two counts of Sexual Misconduct with a Minor, as Class C felonies.1 He was sentenced to six years imprisonment, with two years suspended.

The Indiana Sex Offender Act (originally enacted in 1994) ("the Act"), was amended, effective July 1, 2001 such that one convicted of the crime of Sexual Misconduct with a Minor, as a Class C felony, was required to register as a sex offender. Although Cline's crimes predated the statutory change, he was required upon release from incarceration to register accordingly.

On July 26, 2011, Cline filed his "Amended Petition to Remove Petitioner From Sex Offender Registration Requirement." (App. 20.) A hearing was conducted on July 27, 2011. On October 24, 2011, the trial court issued an order with specific findings. The trial court found that Cline had no obligation to continue to register as a sex offender, because application of the statutory change would constitute ex post facto punishment as to him. However, the trial court also found that it lacked authority to expunge Cline's existing information from the Registry. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

Cline petitioned for relief pursuant to the provision of the Act allowing a sex offender to petition to remove the designation or register under less restrictive conditions. Ind.Code § 11-8-8-22. Generally, a trial court's ruling on a petition for relief filed under subsection 22 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Lucas v. McDonald, 954 N.E.2d 996, 998 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011). Here, however, the issue presented is one of law.

The interpretation of a statute is a legal question that is reviewable de novo. Avemco Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. McCarty, 812 N.E.2d 108, 115 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). We owe no deference to a trial court's determination. Bowling v. State, 960 N.E.2d 837, 841 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). The goal of statutory construction is to determine and implement legislative intent. Fort Wayne Patrolmen's Benev. Ass'n v. Fort Wayne, 903 N.E.2d 493, 497 (Ind.Ct. App.2009), trans. denied. We read all sections of an act and strive to give effect to all provisions. Id. "We will not read into a statute that which is not the manifest intent of the legislature. For this reason, it is as important to recognize not only what a statute says, but also what a statute does not say." Cox v. Cantrell, 866 N.E.2d 798, 809 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.

II. Analysis

Indiana law requires persons convicted of sex or violent crimes to report to and register with local law enforcement. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-14. Sex offenders must fulfill obligations including providing personal information, registering annually,2 being photographed, and keeping law enforcement authority apprised of any changes in work or residence. See id. Sex offender registry information appears on an Internet website jointly established and maintained by Indiana sheriffs. Ind. Code § 36-2-13-5.5.

However, effects of the Act have been declared in violation of the ex post facto clause contained in the Indiana Constitution,3 as applied to persons who had committed their crimes prior to the imposition of any registration requirement. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009) (defendant's conviction for failing to register as a sex offender was reversed because the registration statute, as applied to him, added punishment beyond that which could have been imposed when he committed his crime), reh'g denied; see also State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1154 (Ind.2009) (trial court properly dismissed charge that Pollard violated the residency restriction provision of the Sex Offender Registration Act when he had served his sentence before the Act was enacted and application to him would add punishment beyond that possible when his crime was committed).4

Subsequent to the Wallace decision, our Legislature amended the Act such that it includes a provision allowing a sex offender to petition for removal of the designation, providing in relevant part:

Ind.Code § 11-8-8-22(c)-(d), (g). Cline contends that the foregoing is a statutory codification of Wallace, and must be interpreted so as to not only relieve him of future obligations but also to provide for removal of his name and existing information from the Registry. According to Cline, complete expungement is required to avoid ex post facto punishment because retention of identifying information (even without a duty to provide updates) has a punitive effect upon him akin to the ex post facto punishment discussed in Wallace. He thus argues that, not only should he not have to register in the future, he should be placed in a position as if he had never reported his personal information.

In Wallace, our supreme court recognized that the Act imposes "significant affirmative obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom it applies" and "exposes registrants to profound humiliation and community-wide ostracism." 905 N.E.2d at 379-80. Mindful of such onerous effects, the Court highlighted a deficiency of the Act as it then existed, observing:

Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 384. Effectively, our supreme court invited the Legislature to provide a "mechanism by which a registered sex offender can petition the court for relief from the obligation of continued registration and disclosure" or for shortening the time of obligation. Id. (emphasis added.) The Legislature responded by enacting a mechanism for relief from registration obligations and for shortening of the period of obligation. Notably, the Wallace Court did not address expungement; nor did the legislative response specifically do so.

Although Cline claims he will have to endure the stigma associated with registration even if he does not register in the future, the fact that Cline committed sex crimes is a matter of public record. We do not read the Wallace decision as broadly as does Cline; it does not insulate an offender from all punitive consequences associated with having committed his crimes.5 Furthermore, the statutory provision under which Cline sought relief does not include an expungement provision.6 We will not add such a provision. See Cox, 866 N.E.2d at 809 (observing that we will not read into a statute that which is not the manifest intent of the legislature).

Nonetheless, a panel of this Court has very recently observed: "The undisputed facts here establish that the DOC [the Indiana Department of Correction] determines whether an incarcerated individual belongs on the Registry and also handles complaints about mistaken sex offender registrations." Myers v. Coats, 966 N.E.2d 652, 658 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (emphasis added). We further observed that the DOC had added an administrative appeal to allow for challenges to errors on the Registry. Id. at 658, n. 4. Cline is not precluded from this avenue, although we express no opinion on the breadth of relief to be afforded, if any.

Cline has not demonstrated his entitlement to expungement as a judicial remedy; the trial court did not misapply the law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

Affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., concurs.

ROBB, C.J., dissents with opinion.

ROBB, Chief Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. I begin to explain why by briefly describing the factual and legal context. Upon Cline's release from incarceration, a state office required Cline to add his name and information to the sex offender registry. He later took the initiative to request the court remove7 his name and information, alleging it was unlawful to require him to have registered at all. Following a hearing, the trial court agreed with Cline that authorities violated the Indiana Constitution by requiring he add his name and information to the registry in the first place. I agree, and the majority appears to as well.

The majority further concludes, though, that trial courts have no authority to correct this admitted constitutional violation by ordering the removal of an erroneous-registrant's name and information from the registry. It is this latter conclusion from which I respectfully dissent.

Before going further, it is important to note what this case is not about. It is not about determining whether the registry requirement is an ex post facto law as applied to Cline. It is not about removing one's name and information from the registry due to a change in the law that eliminates an offense for which one must register. For instance, it is not about one who initially registered pursuant to a statute requiring registry for a conviction of sexual misconduct with a minor and later seeks removal upon a statutory change so that one later convicted of that offense is not required to register. This case is also not about removal of one's name and information from the registry or termination of the duty to register upon the passage of a period of time since he or she began registering. See Ind.Code § 11-8-8-19(a). Finally, this case is not about expungement of a conviction from one's criminal history or record.

This is a case about whether a person who should not have had to but was erroneously required to add his name and information to the registry in the first place is entitled to relief in the form of having his name and information removed. The backdrop is Wallace, in which our supreme court held that the sex offender registration act was unconstitutional as applied to one who committed his offense before the act was enacted. See 905 N.E.2d at 384. Specifically, the court held that it "violates the prohibition on ex post facto laws contained in the Indiana Constitution because it imposes burdens that have the effect of adding punishment beyond that which could have been imposed when his crime was committed." Id. The General Assembly responded by amending Indiana Code section 11-8-8-22 to address the supreme court's ex post facto concern.

Thus, this case is also about interpreting and applying section 11-8-8-22. This section is poorly written and confusing. Nevertheless, a logical reading of the following subsections of section 11-8-8-22 determines the fate of Cline's petition.8

Ind.Code § 11-8-8-22.

Subsection (c) states that the relief Cline seeks is available so long as the section applies to Cline. Subsection (b) states that a court may grant a petition to remove one's designation as an offender, referring to subsection (g), if "a change in federal or state law" after a certain date resulted in particular consequences for others. Subsection (g) also describes a court's authority regarding the registry when particular changes in the law occur.

The only way the repeated references to a "change in law" in section 11-8-8-22 make sense is if the section addresses the supreme court's concern that some applications of the registry laws lead to violations of the Indiana Constitution's ex post facto clause. If the statute — particularly subsection (c) — does not mean that a court may remove an offender's name and information from the registry, then it has no meaning at all. "The goal of statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the General Assembly." Sanders v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Brown Cnty., 892 N.E.2d 1249, 1252 (Ind. Ct.App.2008), trans. denied. "[I]n seeking to give effect to the legislature's intent, we... strive to give effect to all of the provisions so that no part is held meaningless if it can be reconciled with the rest of the statute. We presume that our legislature intended for its language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute's underlying policy and goals." Fort Wayne Patrolmen's Benev. Ass'n, 903 N.E.2d at 497-98 (citations omitted).

Further, to the extent it is clear that section 11-8-8-22 is intended to address the Indiana Constitution's prohibition of ex post facto laws, the authority to remove an offender's name and information from the registry must rest with someone. Subsection (c) states that the authority rests with the trial court. The majority suggests Cline take up his cause with the Department of Correction. I believe the trial court is the appropriate authority, first because it is explicitly designated as such in subsection (c), and second because Cline's allegation that his listing violates the Indiana Constitution is one which trial courts have the authority and legal training to address.

The majority also supports its decision, in part, by contending that removal of Cline's name and information from the registry would be pointless because Cline's convictions would remain part of the public record even if he receives the relief he seeks. This implies that the registry is not harmful or punitive, and perhaps is merely a replica of the already-public criminal history of offenders. Our supreme court concluded that the registry is punitive for its relative excessiveness, especially, as the majority points out, because as formulated at the time of Wallace, there was "no mechanism by which a registered sex offender can petition the court for relief from the obligation of continued registration and disclosure." Op. at 1244 (quoting Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 384). As the majority notes, section 11-8-8-22 might have partially or fully addressed this concern.

Regardless, the supreme court concluded the registry is punitive for other reasons too: because it "impose[s] substantial disabilities on registrants," Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 380, "resembles the punishment of shaming," is "comparable to conditions of supervised probation or parole," id. at 381, and it "promote[s] community condemnation of the offender," id. at 382 (quotation omitted). Therefore, it is incorrect to suggest that removal of Cline's name from the registry would be pointless. To the extent the majority construes Cline's request as one to eliminate all punitive consequences associated with having committed his offenses, I believe that to be a different issue.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.